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Abstract
We used to marry people to which we were somehow connected
to: friends of friends, schoolmates, neighbours. Since we were more
connected to people similar to us, we were likely to marry someone
from our own race.
However, online dating has changed this pattern: people who meet
online tend to be complete strangers. Given that one-third of mod-
ern marriages start online, we investigate theoretically, using random
graphs and matching theory, the effects of those previously absent ties
in the diversity of modern societies.
We find that when a society benefits from previously absent ties,
social integration occurs rapidly, even if the number of partners met
online is small. Our findings are consistent with the sharp increase in
interracial marriages in the U.S. in the last two decades.
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1 Introduction
In the most cited article on social networks,1 Granovetter (1973) argued that
the most important connections we have may not be our close friends but
our acquaintances: people that are not very close to us, either physically or
emotionally, help us to relate to groups that we otherwise we would not be
linked to. For example, it is from acquaintances that we are more likely to
hear about job offers. Those weak ties serve as bridges between our group of
close friends and other clustered groups, hence allowing us to connect to the
global community in several ways.2
Interestingly, the process of how we meet our romantic partners in at
least the last hundred years closely resembles this phenomenon. We would
probably not marry our best friends, but we are likely to end up marrying a
friend of a friend or someone we coincided with in the past. Rosenfeld and
Thomas (2012) show how Americans met their partners in the last decades,
listed by importance: through mutual friends, in bars, at work, in educa-
tional institutions, at church, through their families, or because they became
neighbors. This is nothing but the weak ties phenomenon in action.3
But in the last two decades, the way how we meet our romantic partners
has changed dramatically. Rosenfeld and Thomas (2012) argue that “ the
Internet increasingly allows Americans to meet and form relationships with
perfect strangers, that is, people with whom they had no previous social tie”.
To this end, they document that in the last decade online dating has become
the second most popular way to meet a spouse for Americans (see Figure
1).4
Online dating has changed the way people meet their partners not only
in America but in many places around the world. As an example, Figure
2 shows one of the author’s Facebook friends graph. The yellow triangles
reveal previous relationships that started in oﬄine venues. It can easily be
1“What are the most-cited publications in the social sciences according to Google?”,
LSE Blog, 12/05/2016.
2Although most people find a job via weak ties, it is also the case that weak ties are
more numerous. However, the individual value from an additional strong tie is larger than
the one from an additional weak tie (Kramarz and Skans, 2014; Gee et al., 2017).
3Backstrom and Kleinberg (2014) reinforce the previous point: given the social network
of a Facebook user who is in a romantic relationship, the node which has the highest
chances to be his romantic partner is, perhaps surprisingly, not the one who has most
friends in common with him.
4We thank M. Rosenfeld and R. Thomas for allowing us to use their figure.
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Figure 1: How we met our partners in the last decades.
seen that those ex-partners had several mutual friends with the author; in the
corresponding graph, their edge had a high embeddedness in graph-theoretic
jargon. In contrast, nodes appearing as red stars represent partners he met
through online dating. Those have no contacts in common with him, and
thus it is likely that, if it were not for online dating, those persons would
have never interacted with him.
Because one-third of modern marriages start online (Cacioppo et al.,
2013), and up to 70% of homosexual relationships, the way we match on-
line with potential partners shapes the demography of our communities, in
particular its racial diversity. Meeting people outside our social network
online can intuitively increase the number of interracial marriages in our so-
cieties, which is remarkably low. Only 6.3% and 9% of the total number
of marriages are interracial in the U.S. and the U.K., respectively.5 The
low rates of interracial marriage are expected, given that still 50 years ago
these were considered illegal in the U.S., until the Supreme Court ruled out
anti-miscegenation laws in the famous Loving vs. Virginia case.6
5“Interracial marriage: Who is marrying out”, Pew Research Center, 12/6/2015; and
“What does the 2011 census tell us about inter-ethnic relationships?”, UK Office for
National Statistics, 3/7/2014.
6Interracial marriage in the U.S. has increased considerably from 1970, but it is still
rare (Arrow, 1998; Kalmijn, 1998; Fryer, 2007; Furtado, 2015). Interracial marriage occurs
far less frequently than interfaith marriages (Qian, 1997).
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Figure 2: How one of us met his partners in the last decade.
This paper aims at improving our understanding of the impact of online
dating on racial diversity in modern societies. In particular, we intend to find
how many more interracial marriages, if any, will occur after online dating
becomes available in a society. In addition, we are also interested in whether
marriages created online are any different from those that existed before.
Understanding the evolution of interracial marriage is an important prob-
lem, for intermarriage is widely considered a measure of social distance in
our societies (Wong, 2003; Furtado, 2015), just like residential or school seg-
regation. Moreover, the number of interracial marriages in a society has
important economic implications. The combined income of an White-Asian
modern couple is 14.4% higher than than the combined income of an Asian-
Asian marriage, and 18.3% higher than a White-White couple (Wang, 2012).
Even when controlling for factors that may influence the intermarrying deci-
sion, Gius (2013) finds that all interracial couples not involving Afroameri-
cans have higher combined incomes than a White-White couple. He obtains
his findings by analyzing 636,257 observations from the American Commu-
nity Survey (ACS) in 2010. Fu (2007) finds that White people in Hawaii are
65% more likely to live in poverty if they had married outside their own race.
He arrives at this conclusion by also analyzing data from the ACS, but from
2000.7
7There is a large literature that analyzes the effect of marrying an immigrant. This
literature is relevant because often immigrants are from different races than natives. This
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Interracial marriage also affects the offspring of couples who engage in
it. Duncan and Trejo (2011) find that children of an interracial marriage
between a Mexican Latino and an interracial partner enjoy significant human
capital advantages over children born from endogamous Mexican marriages
in the U.S.8 Those human capital advantages include a reduction of 50% in
the high school dropout rate for male children. However, Pearce-Morris and
King (2012) find no differences in the global well-being or behavior problems
between children raised in interracial or intraracial households.
1.1 Overview of Results
This article builds a theoretical framework to explain how many more inter-
racial marriages occur after the establishment of online dating. Our model
combines non-transferable utility9 matching a` la Gale and Shapley (1962)
with random graphs, first studied by Erdo˝s and Re´nyi (1959) and Gilbert
(1959). Our theoretical framework is easy to grasp and has an intuitive
graphical visualization.
We consider a Gale-Shapley marriage problem, in which agents may be-
long to different races or communities. All agents from all races are randomly
located on the same unit square. Agents want to marry the person who is
closest to them, but they can only marry people who they know, i.e. to whom
they are connected. As in real life, agents are highly connected with agents
of their own race, but only poorly so with people from other races. Again
inspired by empirical evidence, we assume that the marriages that occur in
our society are those predicted by game-theoretic stability.10
literature has consistently found that an immigrant who married a native often has a higher
probability of finding employment (Meng and Gregory, 2005; Furtado and Theodoropoulos,
2010; Goel and Lang, 2017). Interestingly, marrying a native increases the probability of
employment, but not the perceived salary (Kantarevic, 2004).
8Although Hispanic is not a race, Hispanics do not associate with other races. In the
2010 U.S. census, over 19 million of Latinos selected to be of “some other race”. See “For
many Latinos, racial identity is more culture than color”, New York Times, 13/1/2012.
9Most of the literature studying marriage with matching models uses transferable util-
ity, following the seminal work of Becker (1973, 1974, 1981). A review of that literature
appears in Browning et al. (2014). Although our model departs substantially from this
literature, we point out similarities with particular papers from this literature in Section
2.
10See Banerjee et al. (2013) for the case of marriage, and Hitsch et al. (2010) for the
case of romantic relationships that start online.
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We introduce online dating in our societies by creating previously absent
ties, obtained by a small increase in the probability that any two agents
of different races are connected. We compare how many more interracial
marriages are formed in the expanded society. We also keep an eye on the
characteristics of those newly formed marriages. In particular, we focus on
the average distance between partners before and after the introduction of
online dating, which we use as a proxy for the strength of marriages in a
society.
The graphical interpretation of our model is similar to the one used by
the mathematics literature in matching of Poisson point processes (Holroyd
et al., 2009; Holroyd, 2011; Amir et al., 2016), from which we borrow useful
technical results (see the proof of Proposition 1, which establishes unique-
ness of the stable marriage). Our model also roughly resembles the graphical
model of residential segregation of Schelling (1969, 1971, 1972). However,
unlike the famous Schelling model, our model predicts nearly complete racial
integration upon the emergence of online dating, even if the number of part-
ners that individuals meet from newly formed ties is small. Our model also
predicts that marriages created in a society with online dating tend to be
stronger.
We obtain these predictions by considering randomly generated societies,
and analyzing the evolution of their diversity and strength over 10,000 sim-
ulations. We use simulations because we prove in Proposition 2 that our
welfare measures are not edge-monotonic, meaning they may decrease when
societies become more interracially connected. It is perhaps counter-intuitive
that adding interracial connections may decrease the number of interracial
marriages, but the logic behind this result is simple. An interracial connec-
tion may create an interracial marriage at the cost of destroying two existing
ones. Similarly, we find that adding an interracial connection may even de-
crease the total number of marriages (interracial or not) in a society.
We contrast our theoretical results with empirical U.S. data, and find
that, as predicted by our model, the number of interracial marriages sub-
stantially increases after the popularization of online dating. We discuss how
the observed sharp increase cannot be purely due to changes in the composi-
tion of the U.S. population. We also present evidence that marriages created
online have a lower divorce rate, as predicted by our model.
Our results contribute to clarify the relationship between social networks
and interracial marriage. In a related paper, Furtado and Theodoropoulos
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(2010) find that immigrants who intermarry have a higher chance of finding
employment than those who marry within their own ethnic group. Interest-
ingly, most of this effect is due to the valuable social networks that immi-
grants gain by marrying a local (and not because an easier chance to get a
visa). In their model, intermarriage creates social networks. In ours, social
networks generate intermarriage, by creating previously absent ties within
races via online dating. The increase in the number of interracial marriages
in our model does not require a changes in agents’ preferences.
1.2 Structure of the Article
We present our model in Section 2. Section 3 introduces the welfare measures
underlying the further analysis. Sections 4 and 5 analyze how these measure
change when societies become more connected using theoretical analysis and
simulations, respectively.
Section 6 contrasts our model predictions with observed demographic
trends from the U.S. Section 7 concludes and provides an outlook on other
potential applications of our theoretical framework.
2 Marriages in a Network
2.1 Agents
There are r races or communities, each with n agents. Each agent i is
identified by a pair of coordinates (xi, yi) ∈ [0, 1]2, that can be understood
as measures of agents’ social and political opinions,11 to which we refer as
personality traits. Both coordinates are drawn uniformly and independently
for all agents.12
11For a real-life representation using a 2-dimensional plane see
www.politicalcompass.org. A similar interpretation appears in Chiappori et al.
(2012) and in Chiappori et al. (2016), in which the traits include age, education, race,
religion, weight or height.
12Another way to understand how agents’ personality traits are drawn is to consider a
Poisson point process (PPP) defined on the unit square with intensity λ = n. In a PPP
the number of agents is not fixed but drawn from a Poisson distribution, although there
are n in expectation. In our case, the number of agents is fixed throughout.
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Each agent is either male or female. Female agents are plotted as stars
and males as dots. Each race is balanced in its ratio between men and women.
Each race is assigned a particular color.
2.2 Edges
Agents are connected to others of their own race with probability p: these
edges are represented as solid lines and occur independently of each other.
Agents are connected to others of different race with probability q: these
interracial edges appear as dotted lines and are also independent. We present
an illustrative example in Figure 3.
Our model is a generalization of the random graph model (Erdo˝s and
Re´nyi, 1959; Gilbert, 1959; for a textbook reference, see Bolloba´s, 2001). In
our model, there are r random graphs with parameter p and n nodes. Nodes
are connected across graphs with probability q. The intuition in our model
is that two agents are connected if they know each other. In expectation,
each agent is connected to n(r − 1)q + (n− 1)p persons.
A society S is a realization from a generalized random graph model, de-
fined by a four-tuple (n, r, p, q). A society S has a corresponding graph
S = (M ∪W ;E), where M and W are the set of men and women, respec-
tively, and E is the set of edges. We use the notation E(i, j) = 1 if there is
an edge between agents i and j, and 0 otherwise. We denote such edge by
either (ij) or (ji).
2.3 Agents’ Preferences
All agents are heterosexual and prefer marrying anyone over remaining alone.13
We denote by Pi the set of potential partners for i. The preferences of agent i
are given by a function δi : Pi → R+ that has a distance interpretation.14 An
agent i prefers agent j over agent k if δi(i, j) ≤ δi(i, k). The intuition is that
agents like potential partners that are close to them in terms of personality
13Heterosexuality is assumed for convenience, because it is well-known that in one-sided
matching there may be no stable pairings.
14Although δ can be generalized to include functions that violate the symmetry
(δ(x, y) 6= δ(y, x)) and identity (δ(x, x) = 0) characteristic properties of mathematical
distances.
8
Figure 3: 4 agents, 2 races, linked with p = 1 and q = 0.2.
traits.
The function δi could be arbitrary, or could be the same for agents of
the same race. It could also be weighted to account for strong intraracial
preferences that are often observed in reality (Wong, 2003; Fisman et al.,
2008; Hitsch et al., 2010; Rudder, 2014; Potarca and Mills, 2015; McGrath
et al., 2016).15 Inter or intraracial preferences can easily be incorporated
into the model, as in equation (3) below, but for ease of exposition and
mathematical convenience, we only consider in the main text two intuitive
and simple functions that do not incorporate homophily. We incorporate
homophily in Appendix B.
The first one is the Euclidean distance for all agents, so that for any agent
i and every potential partner j 6= i,
δE(i, j) =
√
(xi − xj)2 + (yi − yj)2 (1)
and δE(i, i) =
√
2 ∀i ∈M ∪W .16 Euclidean preferences are intuitive and
15It is not clear whether the declared intraracial preferences show an intrinsic intraracial
predilection or capture external biases, which, when removed, leave the partner indifferent
to match across races. Evidence supporting the latter hypothesis includes: Fryer (2007)
documents that White and Black U.S. veterans have had higher intermarry rates after
serving with mixed communities. Fisman et al. (2008) finds that people do not find
partners of their own race more attractive. Rudder (2009) shows that online daters have a
roughly equal user compatibility. Lewis (2013) finds that users are more willing to engage
on interracial dating if they interacted earlier with a dater from another race.
16We deviate from the usual definition of Euclidean distance to allow for a more intuitive
9
have been widely used in social science (Bogomolnaia and Laslier, 2007). The
indifference curves associated with Euclidean preferences can be described by
concentric circles around each point.
The second preferences we consider are such that every agent prefers a
partner close to them in personality trait x, but they all agree on the optimum
value in personality trait y. The intuition is that the y-coordinate indicates
an attribute like wealth, that is usually considered desirable by all partners.
We call these preferences assortative.17 Formally, for any agent i and every
potential partner j 6= i,
δA(i, j) = |xi − xj|+ (1− yj) (2)
and δE(i, i) = 2 ∀i ∈ M ∪ W . The indifference curves of assortative
preferences are depicted in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Indifference curves for assortative preferences (the blue star is the
best partner for the red dot).
Both Euclidean and assortative preferences can be generalized by weight-
ing them by specific constants βij, such that
δ′i = βij δ(i, j) (3)
definitions of marriages in the next Subsection.
17If we keep the x-axis fixed, so that agents only care about the y-axis, we get full
assortative mating as a particular case.
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The factor βij captures intraracial specific preferences whenever it is con-
stant for all pairs i, j who belong to the same race, but different for all pairs
i, k not belonging to the same race. Similarly, it can capture specific reluc-
tance to match with agents from specific races whenever above 1. We use
this function to incorporate homophily in preferences in Appendix B.
A society in which all agents have either all Euclidean or all assortative
preferences will be called Euclidean or assortative, respectively. We focus
on these two cases. In both cases agents’ preferences are strict because we
assume personality traits are drawn from a continuous distribution.
2.4 Marriages
Agents can only marry potential partners they know: i.e. if there exists a
path of length at most k between them in the society graph.18 We consider
two types of marriages:
1. Direct marriages: k = 1. Agents can only marry if they know each
other.
2. Long marriages: k = 2. Agents can only marry if they know each other
or if they have a mutual friend in common.
To formalize the previous marriage notion, let ρk(i, j) = 1 if there is a
path of at most length k between i and j, with the convention ρ1(i, i) = 1.
A marriage µ : M ∪W →M ∪W of length k is a function that satisfies
∀m ∈M µ(m) ∈ W ∪ {m} (4)
∀w ∈ W µ(w) ∈M ∪ {w} (5)
∀i ∈M ∪W µ(µ(i)) = i (6)
∀i ∈M ∪W µ(i) = j only if ρk(i, j) = 1 (7)
We use the convention that agents that remain unmarried are matched
to themselves. We use M∗ = {m ∈ M | µ(m) ∈ W} to denote the set of all
married men.
18A path from node i to t is a set of edges (ij), (jk), . . . , (st). The length of the path is
the number of such pairs.
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Because realized romantic pairings are close to those predicted by stability
(Hitsch et al., 2010; Banerjee et al., 2013), we assume that marriages that
occur in each society are stable. A marriage µ is k-stable if there is no
man-woman pair (m,w) who are not married to each other such that
ρk(m,w) = 1 (8)
δ(m,w) < δ(m,µ(m)) (9)
δ(w,m) < δ(w, µ(w)) (10)
Condition (8) is the only non-standard one in the matching literature,
that ensures that a pair of agents cannot block a direct marriage if they are
not connected in the corresponding graph, even if they prefer each other to
their respective partner. Given our assumptions regarding agents’ prefer-
ences,
Proposition 1. For any positive integer k, every Euclidean or assortative
society has a unique k-stable marriage.
Proof. For the Euclidean society, a simple algorithm computes the unique k-
stable marriage. Let every person point to their preferred partner to whom
they are connected to by a path of length at most k. In case two people point
to each other, marry them and remove them from the graph. Let everybody
point to their new preferred partner to which they are connected to among
those still left. Again, marry those that choose each other, and repeat the
procedure until no mutual pointing occurs. The procedure ends after at most
rn
2
iterations. This algorithm is a minor modification of the one suggested
by Holroyd et al. (2009, Proposition 9) for 1-stable matchings.19
For the assortative society, assume by contradiction that there are two
k-stable matchings µ and µ′ such that for two men m1 and m2, and two
women w1 and w2, µ(w1) = w1 and µ(w2) = w2, but µ
′(w1) = w2 and
µ′(w2) = w1.20 The fact that both marriages are k-stable implies, without
loss of generality, that for i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j, δ(mi, wi) − δ(mi, wj) < 0
and δ(wi,mj)−δ(wi,mi) < 0. Adding up those four inequalities, one obtains
0 < 0, a contradiction. 
19Holroyd et al. (2009) require two additional properties: non-equidistance and no de-
scending chains. The first one is equivalent to strict preferences, the second one is trivially
satisfied. In their algorithm, agents point to the closest agent, independently if they are
connected to them.
20It could be the case that in the two matchings there are no four people who change
partner, but that the swap involves more agents. The argument readily generalizes.
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Figure 5 shows the direct and long stable marriages for the Euclidean and
assortative societies depicted in Figure 3.
(a) Direct marriage, Euclidean pref. (b) Long marriage, Euclidean pref.
(c) Direct marriage, assortative pref. (d) Long marriage, assortative pref.
Figure 5: Direct and long stable marriages for the assortative society in Fig.
3.
2.5 Online Dating on Networks
We model online dating in a society S by increasing the number of interracial
edges. Given the graph S = (M ∪W ;E), we create new interracial edges
between every pair that is disconnected with a probability .21,22
S denotes a society that results after online dating has occurred in society
S. S has exactly the same nodes as S, and all its edges, but potentially more.
21Online dating is likely to also increase the number of edges inside each race, but since
we assume that each race is already fully connected, these new edges play no role. We
perform robustness checks in Appendix B, increasing both p and q but keeping its ratio
fixed.
22We could assume that particular persons are more likely than others to use online
dating, e.g. younger people. Data shows that, from 2013 to 2015, the percentage of people
who use online dating has increased for people of all ages. See: “5 facts about online
dating”, Pew Research Center, 29/2/2016. While this occurs at a different rate, to obtain
our main result we only need a small increase in the probability of interconnection for each
agent.
13
We say that the society S is an expansion of the society S.
3 Welfare Measures
We want to understand how the welfare of a society changes after online
dating becomes available, i.e. after a society becomes more interracially
connected. We consider three welfare measures:
1. Size, i.e. the total number of marriages in a society. Formally,
sz(S) = |M∗| (11)
2. Diversity, i.e. how many marriages are interracial. We normalize this
measure so that 0 indicates a society with no interracial marriages, and 1
indicates a society in which a fraction r−1
r
of the marriages are interracial,
i.e. the ratio that obtains in a complete graph in expectation. Note that
diversity may be above 1.
Let R be a function that maps each agent to their race. Then
dv(S) =
|{m ∈M∗ | R(m) 6= R(µ(m))}|
sz(S)
· r
r − 1 (12)
3. Strength, defined as
√
2 minus the average Euclidean distance between
each married couple, denoted as ds(S). A society is stronger whenever its
marriages are between agents who are closer to each other. A marriage with
a small distance is better than one with a large one because is less susceptible
to break up when random agents appear on the unit square, provided that
the new outcome is to be k-stable too. The previous observation holds for
assortative societies as well.
The above indicator is divided by
√
2 (or the maximal distance possible) to
normalize it between 0 and 1.
Formally,
ds(S) =
∑
m∈M∗ δ
E(m,µ(m))
sz(S)
(13)
st(S) =
√
2− ds(S)√
2
(14)
If every married agent gets paired with her perfect match, then st(S) = 1.
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4 Edge Monotonicity of Welfare Measures
Given a society S, the first question we ask is whether the welfare measures
of a society always increase when its number of interracial edges grow, i.e.
when online dating becomes available. We refer to this property as edge
monotonicity.23
Definition 1. A welfare measure w is edge monotonic if, for any society S,
and any of its extensions S, we have
w(S) ≥ w(S) (15)
If a welfare measure is edge monotonic it means that a society unam-
biguously becomes better off after becoming more interracially connected.
Unfortunately,
Proposition 2. Diversity, strength, and size are all not edge monotonic.
Before proving Proposition 2, let us build some intuition about it. It may
be surprising that the number of interracial marriages can decrease when
more interracial edges are formed. The intuition behind it is that a newly
formed interracial edge may create one interracial marriage at the cost of
destroying two existing ones, and the left-alone partners may now marry
partners of their own race.
An interracial edge can similarly increase the average distance between
couples if it provides a link between very desirable partners, i.e. those in
the center for the case of Euclidean preferences. Those desirable partners
are likely to drop their current spouses. The dropped agents now have to
match with partners that have been dropped too, which are potentially fur-
ther away from them. An interracial edge can similarly increase the average
distance between couples if it provides a link between very desirable partners,
i.e. those in the center for the case of Euclidean preferences. Those desir-
able partners are likely to drop their current spouses. The dropped agents
now have to match with partners that have been dropped too, which are
potentially further away from them.
23Edge monotonicity is different from node monotonicity, in which one node, with all
its corresponding edges, is added to the matching problem. It is well-known that when
a new man joins a stable matching problem, every woman weakly improves, while every
man becomes weakly worse off (Theorems 5 in Kelso and Crawford, 1982, 2.25 and 2.26
in Roth and Sotomayor, 1992, and 1 and 2 in Crawford, 1991).
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Finally, size can be reduced if the new interracial edge links people who
were already highly connected in the society, making them leave partners
who are poorly so. The left-alone partners may now become unable to find
a partner.
We present now a formal proof for Euclidean societies with direct mar-
riages.
Proof. To show that size is not edge monotonic, consider the society in Figure
3 and its direct stable matching in Figure 5a. Remove all interracial edges:
it is immediate that in the unique stable matching there are 4 couples now,
one more than when interracial edges are present.
For the case of strength, consider a simple society in which all nodes
share the same y-coordinate, as the one depicted in Figure 6. There are
two intraracial marriages and the average Euclidean distance is 0.35. When
we add the interracial edge between the two central nodes, the closest nodes
marry and the two far away nodes marry too. The average Euclidean distance
in the expanded society increases to 0.45, hence reducing its strength.
Figure 6: Strength is not edge monotonic.
To show that diversity is not edge monotonic, consider Figure 7. There
are two men and two women of each of two races a and b. Each gender is
represented with the superscript + or −.
Stability requires that µ(b−1 ) = a
+
1 and µ(b
+
2 ) = a
−
2 , and everyone else is
unmarried. However, when we add the interracial edge (a+1 b
−
2 ), the married
couples become µ(b−1 ) = b
+
1 , µ(a
+
2 ) = a
−
1 , and µ(a
+
1 ) = b
−
2 . In this extended
society, there is just one interracial marriage, out of a total of three, when
before we had two out of two. Therefore diversity reduces after adding the
edge (a+1 b
−
2 ). 
The failure of edge monotonicity by our three welfare measures makes
16
(a) dv(S) = 2 (b) dv(S) = 1/3
Figure 7: Diversity is not edge monotonic.
evident that to evaluate welfare changes in societies, we need to understand
how welfare varies on an average society after introducing new interracial
edges. We develop this comparison in the next Section.
A final comment on edge monotonicity. The fact that the size of a society
is not edge monotonic, as shown in Proposition 2, implies that adding in-
terracial edges may not lead to a Pareto improvement for the society. Some
agents may become worse off after the society becomes more connected. Nev-
ertheless, the fraction of agents that becomes worse off after adding an extra
edge is never more than one-half of the society. Ortega (2017) discusses this
phenomenon in detail and characterizes the associated welfare losses of those
hurt by integration.
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5 Average Welfare Measures
In the last Section we found that our three welfare measures may increase or
decrease after adding interracial edges. Therefore, we need to analyze what
happens to welfare in expectation when agents become more connected.
There are two ways to answer this question. The first one is to provide
analytical expressions for the expected welfare measures as a function of
the number of interracial edges. However, providing analytical solutions
is incredibly complicated, if not impossible. Already solving the expected
average distance in a toy society with just one race, containing only one
man and one woman, requires a complicated computation (which eventually
becomes 2+
√
2+5 ln(
√
2+1)
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≈ 0.52).24
The second way to approach the problem is to simulate several random
societies and observe how their average welfare change when they become
more connected. This is the route we follow. We create ten thousand random
societies, and increase the expected number of interracial edges by increasing
the parameter q. In the following subsections, we describe the changes of our
welfare measures for different values of q.
In all cases we fix n = 50 and p = 1.25 We consider the following four
scenarios:
1. Two races and direct marriages, appears in blue with diamond markers .
2. Five races and direct marriages, appears in grey with square markers .
3. Two races and long marriages, appears in orange with triangle markers N.
4. Five races and long marriages, appears in yellow with cross markers ×.
24The detailed computation appears in “Distance between two random points in a
square”, Mind your Decisions, 3/6/2016.
25We restrict to n = 50 and ten thousand replications because of computational limita-
tions, even though we used the high performance computing facilities at the University of
Glasgow. The results for other values of p are similar and we present them in Appendix
B. The Matlab code is available at www.josueortega.com.
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5.1 Diversity
In the case of long marriages, even the smallest increase in the probability of
interracial connections (in this case of 0.05) achieves perfect social integra-
tion. With either two or five races we obtain that diversity is exactly one.
For the cases with direct marriages, the increase in diversity is slower but
still fast: an increase of q from 0 to 0.1 increases diversity to 0.19 for r = 2,
and from 0 to 0.37 with r = 5.26
(a) Euclidean society. (b) Assortative society
Figure 8: Average diversity (y-axis) of a random society for different values
of q.
The yellow and orange curves are indistinguishable in this plot because they are identical. Exact values
and standard errors (which are in the order of 1.0e-04) are provided in Appendix A.
Figure 8 summarizes our main result, namely
Result 1. Diversity is fully achieved with long marriages, even if the increase
in interracial connections is arbitrarily small.
With direct marriages, diversity is achieved partially but still substan-
tially, so that an increase in q always yields an increase in diversity of a
larger size, i.e. diversity is a concave function of q.
The intuition behind full diversity for the case of long marriages is that,
once an agent obtains just one edge to any other race, he gains n
2
potential
26Empirical evidence suggests that q is close to zero. Echenique and Fryer (2007) find
that the typical American public school student has 0.7 friends of another race. It is also
a sensible assumption that p is large, given the clear residential segregation patterns in
the U.S. (Cutler et al., 1999) and that around 90% of people who attend religious services
do so with others from their same race (Fryer, 2007).
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partners. Just one edge to a person of different race gives access to that
person’s complete race.
The reader may think that the full diversity result heavily depends on
each race being fully connected, i.e. p = 1. This is not the case. We obtain
full diversity for many other values of p, as we discuss in Appendix B. When
same-race agents are less interconnected within themselves, agents gain fewer
connections once an interracial edge is created, but those fewer connections
are relatively more valuable, because the agent had himself less potential
partners before the creation of new interracial edges.
Result 1 implies that, assuming long marriages are formed, very few inter-
racial links can lead a society to almost complete racial integration, and leads
to very optimistic views on the role that dating platforms can play in the
reduction of racial segregation in our society. Our result is in sharp contrast
to the one of Schelling (1969, 1971) in its well-known models of residential
segregation, in which a society always gets completely segregated.
We pose this finding as the first testable hypothesis of our model
Hypothesis 1. The number of interracial marriages should increase after
the popularization of online dating.
5.2 Strength
A second observation, less pronounced that the increase in diversity, is that
the strength of the society goes up when increasing q. For an illustration,
see Figure 9, which considers the same four cases as before in both Euclidean
and assortative societies.
It is clear that, for all combinations of parameters (see Appendix B for
further robustness checks), there is a consistent trend downwards in the av-
erage distance of partners after adding new interracial edges, and thus a
consistent increase in strength of the societies. We present this observation
as our second result.
Result 2. Strength increases after the number of interracial edges increases.
The increase is faster whenever the society has more races, and converges to
a higher level with long marriages.
Assuming that marriages with a higher average distance have a higher
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(a) Euclidean society. (b) Assortative society
Figure 9: Average strength (y-axis) of a random society for different values
of q.
Exact values and standard errors (which are in the order of 1.0e-04) provided in Appendix A.
chance to end up divorcing, because they are more susceptible to break up
when new nodes are added to the society graph, we can reformulate our result
as our second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2. Marriages created in societies with online dating should have
a lower divorce rate.
Finally, our last welfare measure, size, keeps constant for most of our
simulations, so we do not discuss it further. The detailed data behind Figures
8 and 9 appear in Appendix A.
Our analysis of the expected changes in welfare gives us with two testable
hypotheses. In the next Section, we contrast them against data on of inter-
racial marriage in the U.S, and the quality of the marriages created through
online dating.
6 Hypotheses and Data
6.1 Hypothesis 1: More Interracial Marriages
What does the data reveal? Is our model consistent with observed demo-
graphic trends? Figure 10 presents the evolution of interracial marriages
among newlyweds in the U.S. from 1967 to 2015, based on the 2008-2015
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American Community Survey and 1980, 1990 and 2000 decennial censuses
(IPUMS). In this Figure, interracial marriages include those between White,
Black, Hispanic, Asian, American Indian or multiracial persons.27
Figure 10: Percentage of interracial marriages among newlyweds in the U.S.
Source: Pew Research Center analysis of 2008-2015 American Community Survey and 1980, 1990 and
2000 decennial censuses (IPUMS). The red, green, and purple lines represent the creation of Match.com,
OKCupid, and Tinder, three of the largest dating websites. The blue line represents a linear prediction
for 1996 – 2015 using the data from 1967 to 1995.
We observe that the number of interracial marriages has consistently in-
creased in the last 50 years, as it has been documented by several other
authors (Kalmijn, 1998; Fryer, 2007; Furtado, 2015). However, it is intrigu-
ing that shortly after the introduction of the first dating websites in 1995, like
Match.com, the percentage of new marriages created by interracial couples
increased rapidly. The increase becomes steeper around 2004, when online
dating became more popular: it is then when well-known platforms such like
OKCupid emerged. During the 2000’s decade, the percentage of new mar-
riages that are interracial changed from 10.68% to 15.54%, a huge increase
of nearly 5 percentage points, or 50%.
27We are grateful to Gretchen Livingston from the Pew Research Center for providing
us with the data. Data prior to 1980 are estimates. The methodology on how the data
was collected is described in Livingston and Brown (2017).
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After the 2009 increase, the proportion of new interracial marriage jumps
again in 2014 to 17.24%, remaining above 17% in 2015 too. Again, it is
interesting that this increase occurs shortly after the creation of Tinder,
considered the most popular online dating app. Tinder, created in 2012, has
approximately 50 million users and produces more than 12 million matches
per day.28 Matches can be thought of newly established edges, in the language
of our model.
We do not claim that the increase in the share of new marriages that are
interracial in the last 20 years is caused by the emergence of online dating
alone, but this finding is in line with Hypothesis 1 in our model.
Another cause for the steep increase described could be that the U.S.
population is more interracial now than 20 years ago. The reduction of the
percentage of Americans who are White, falling from 83.1% to 72.4% from
1980 to 2010, would yield an increase of the rate of interracial marriage,
assuming random marriage. However, the change in the population com-
position in the U.S cannot explain the huge increase in intermarriage that
we observe. In Appendix C we show that, even controlling for demographic
change, we observe an increase of interracial marriages, although certainly
smaller.
A more transparent way to see that the increase in the number of inter-
racial marriages cannot be due to changes in population composition alone
is too look at the growth of interracial marriages for Black Americans. Black
Americans are the racial group whose rate of interracial marriage has in-
creased the most, going from 5% in 1980 to 18% in 2015. However, the
fraction of the U.S. population who is Black has changed very little in the
last 40 years, remaining constant around 12% of the population. Random
marriage accounting for population change would then predict that the rate
of interracial marriages remains roughly constant, although in reality it has
more than triplicate in the last 35 years.
28“Tinder, the fast-growing dating app, taps an age-old truth”, New York Times,
29/10/2014. The company claims that 36% of Facebook users have had an account on
their platform.
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6.2 Hypothesis 2: Marriages Created Online Are Less
Likely to Divorce
Cacioppo et al. (2013) find that marriages created online were less likely to
break up and reveal a higher marital satisfaction, using a sample of 19,131
Americans who married between 2005 and 2012. They write: “Meeting a
spouse on-line is on average associated with slightly higher marital satis-
faction and lower rates of marital break-up than meeting a spouse through
traditional (off-line) venues”.
The findings of Cacioppo and his coauthors show that our model pre-
dictions closely match the observed properties of marriages created online,
and its strength compared to marriages created on other, more traditional
venues.
Our model predicts that, on average, marriages created when online dat-
ing becomes available last longer than those created in societies without this
technology. Yet, it is silent regarding comparisons between the strength of
interracial and intraracial marriages. There is empirical evidence showing
that interracial marriages are more likely to end up in divorce (Bratter and
King, 2008; Zhang and Van Hook, 2009).
Our model is also silent on why some intraracial marriages from a par-
ticular race last longer than intraracial marriages from another race (e.g.
Stevenson and Wolfers, 2007 show that Blacks who divorce spend more time
in their marriage than their White counterparts).
7 Final Remarks
7.1 Further Applications
The theoretical model we present discusses a general matching problem under
network constraints, and hence it can be useful to study other social phe-
nomena besides interracial marriage. The races or communities in our model
can be understood as arbitrary groups of highly clustered agents. Agents can
be clustered by race, but also by ethnicity, education, socioeconomic status,
religion, nationality, etcetera. Thus, our theoretical model can be also ap-
plied to study interfaith marriages, or marriages between people of different
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social status.
The role of connecting highly clustered groups is also not only linked to
online dating. Another example is the European student exchange program
“Erasmus”, which helped more than 3 million students and over 350 thousand
academics and staff members to spend time at a University abroad.29
The matching of agents also goes beyond marriage. Think of nodes being
researchers at a University, races being academic departments, and edges
representing who knows whom. Matchings indicate academic collaboration
in articles or grants. The Euclidean distance interpretation makes sense, as a
microeconomist in a business school may be better off partnering with a game
theorist at the biology department rather than with an econometrician in his
own business school. Diversity in a University would be then a measure for
interdisciplinary research, often encouraged by higher education institutions
and funding bodies. Interdiscplinary seminars, for example, could take the
role of creating links between academics in different departments.
It would be interesting to test our model against in this other scenarios.
We leave this task for further research.
7.2 Conclusion
We introduce a simple theoretical model which tries to explain the complex
process of deciding whom to marry in the times of online dating. As any
model, ours has limitations. It categorizes every individual with only two
characteristics, it assumes a very simple structure inside each race, it poses
restrictions on agents’ preferences. Furthermore, it fails to capture many
of the complex features of romance in social networks, like love. There are
multiple ways to enrich and complicate the model with more parameters.
However, the simplicity of our model is its main strength. With a basic
structure, it can generate very strong predictions. It suggests that the di-
versity of societies, measured by the number of interracial marriages in it,
should increase drastically after the introduction of online dating. Societies
where online dating is available should produce marriages that are less likely
to break up. Both predictions are consistent with observed demographic
29“ERASMUS: Facts, figures and trends.”, European Commission, 10/6/2014. Interest-
ingly, Parey and Waldinger (2011) find that participating in ERASMUS to study abroad
increases the probability of working abroad by 15 percentage points.
25
trends.
Simple models are great tools to convey an idea. Schelling’s segregation
model clearly does not capture many important components of how people
decide where to live. It could have been enhanced by introducing thousands
of parameters. Yet it has broadened the way how we understand racial seg-
regation, and has been widely influential: according to Google Scholar, it has
been quoted 3,258 times by articles coming from sociology to mathematics.
It has provided us a way to think about an ubiquitous phenomenon.
Our model goes in the same direction.
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A Appendix A: Simulation Results
Table 1: Supporting data for Figures 8 and 9
q 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00
Panel A: Welfare on Euclidean societies
r = 2, direct marriages
Dv 0.00 0.10 0.19 0.27 0.34 0.41 0.47 0.57 0.66 0.75 0.82 0.89 0.94 1.00
St 0.85 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.89
Sz 1.00 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
r = 2, long marriages
Dv 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
St 0.85 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.89 0.89
Sz 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
r = 5,direct marriages
Dv 0.00 0.22 0.37 0.47 0.56 0.62 0.68 0.77 0.83 0.88 0.92 0.95 0.98 1.00
St 0.85 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
Sz 1.00 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
r = 5, long marriages
Dv 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
St 0.85 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
Sz 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Panel B: Welfare on assortative societies
r = 2, direct marriages
Dv 0.00 0.11 0.20 0.28 0.35 0.41 0.47 0.57 0.66 0.75 0.82 0.88 0.95 1.00
St 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87
Sz 1.00 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
r = 2, long marriages
Dv 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
St 0.84 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87
Sz 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
r = 5,direct marriages
Dv 0.00 0.23 0.37 0.48 0.56 0.63 0.68 0.77 0.83 0.88 0.92 0.95 0.98 1.00
St 0.84 0.87 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.91 0.91
Sz 1.00 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
r = 5, long marriages
Dv 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
St 0.84 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91
Sz 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
∗Average over 10,000 random simulations, n = 50, p = 1.
Sz equals the percentage of agents married.
Standard errors in the order of 1.0e-04, so we do not present them.
B Appendix B: Robustness Checks
In this Appendix we conduct several robustness checks to show that the fast
increase in the diversity of societies, described in Result 1, occurs for many
combinations of model parameters.
B.1 Different Values of p
The first exercise we conduct is to simulate the model again, but varying the
probability of intraracial connections p to 0.7, 0.5 and 0.3. We allow q to
vary between 0 and p, as we have explained in the text that q ≤ p, because
people tend to be more connected to people from their own race.
With respect to diversity, long marriages always lead to an almost im-
mediate increase to 1, meaning complete social integration. This increase is
shown in Figure 11. As expected, a society integrates faster when the value
of p is higher.
With respect to strength, we also observe minor variations, which appear
in Figure 12. A smaller p makes agents less connected to potential partners,
and thus the strength of resulting marriages becomes weaker. With long
marriages, strength converges very quickly to its optimal value, around 0.9,
which again, is smaller in societies with low values of p and q.
The detailed results of our simulations with p equal to 0.7, 0.5, and 0.3
appear in Tables 2, 3 and 4 at the end of this Appendix.
(a) Euclidean society, p = .7. (b) Assortative society, p = .7
(c) Euclidean society, p = .5. (d) Assortative society, p = .5
(e) Euclidean society, p = .3. (f) Assortative society, p = .3
Figure 11: Average diversity (y-axis) of a random society for several values
of p.
(a) Euclidean society, p = .7. (b) Assortative society, p = .7
(c) Euclidean society, p = .5. (d) Assortative society, p = .5
(e) Euclidean society, p = .3. (f) Assortative society, p = .3
Figure 12: Average stregth (y-axis) of a random society for several values of
p.
B.2 Varying p and q Simultaneously
The second robustness test we perform is to vary p and q simultaneously but
keeping its ratio fixed. Both parameters indicate how connected a person is
to people of his own race and to people of other races.
To find a good estimate of the ratio p
q
, we use data from the American
Values Survey by the Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI), a nonpar-
tisan, independent research organization. The data is well described in the
following article from the Washington Post: “Three quarters of Whites dont
have any non-White friends”, 25/8/2014.
The PRRI data shows that, if a White American has 100 friends, 91 are
expected to be of his own race, and 1 Black, 1 Latino, and 1 Asian (the rest
are multiracial or of unknown race). Black Americans are more interracially
connected, with 83 friends expected to be of his own race, 8 Whites, 2 Latinos,
and and no Asians.
Based on this data, we use the ratio p/q = 10, based on the ratio between
the expected number of Black and White friends for Black people. This
ratio implies that a person is 10 times more likely to be connected to a
person from her own race. We vary p from 0 to 1. We present the results
for Euclidean societies only (as we have seen that Euclidean and assortative
societies produce almost identical results).
(a) Diversity. (b) Strength.
Figure 13: Average diversity and strength of a random society for p ∈ [0, 1].
A first conclusion we obtain is that, with long marriages, we observe
complete integration, just as we did when increasing q alone. However, this
time it does not happen as quickly as when we increase only q. With direct
marriages the increase is very fast but full integration is not obtained. It only
reaches values of 20% and 40% in societies with 2 and 5 races, respectively.
We could say that the diversity achieved when agents’ intra and interracial
circles both expand is much lower, compared to the results shown in the main
text. But this this conclusion is flawed, because we compare our diversity
measure to one where agents were completely connected within their own
race, i.e. a complete graph. Therefore, the diversity obtained already is
20% and 40% of the diversity in a complete graph. This is a very high
percentage of interracial marriages, because we fix that agents are 10 times
more connected withing their own race. Notice that the results (Table 6 are
consistent with what is displayed in Figures 8 and 9, for the point q = 0.1.
Finally, the strength levels we observe with direct marriages are the lowest
we have found so far, which is not surprising given the small number of
potential partners that agents have. It is equally expected to observe that
the strength of a society increases when p grows.
The detailed results of our simulations with p/q = 10 appear in Table 5
at the end of this Appendix.
B.3 Homophily
The third robustness test we perform is to introduce intraracial preferences,
as described in equation (3). We do this in the following intuitive way.
Agents prefer marrying someone from their own race β times as much as
marrying someone from another race. This is, for agents i, j, k, with agents
i and j being from the same race, and agent k being from another race, i is
indifferent between j and k only if δ(i, j) = β δ(i, k), where β ≥ 1. We still
impose that marrying any potential partner is better than remaining alone
for all agents.
There is evidence suggesting that persons substitute similarities in race for
similarities in personality traits. See Furtado (2012) for evidence of tradeoffs
in marriage choices between race and education.
Figure 14 presents the behavior of diversity and strength when agents
prefer their own race twice and β = 2. With long marriages, we obtain a fast
increase in diversity of our societies. However, only a diversity of 0.4 and
0.6 is achieved with 2 and 5 races, respectively. This is the diversity with
respect to a society with β = 1. Therefore, the diversity achieved is large,
even when agents have intraracial preferences.
With direct marriages, we observe that the increase converges to the same
levels as with long marriages, but at a slower rate. The increase is a concave
function of q, as documented in the main text when no homophily is present.
(a) Diversity. (b) Strength.
Figure 14: Average diversity and strength of a random society with β = 2.
The reader may wonder how large β needs to be so that no diversity
occurs in the society. Figure 15 shows how diversity changes as a function of
β, for a society with p = q = 1. What we find is that even when agents prefer
their own race 3.5 times as much as any other race, the society achieves 20%
of the integration it would achieve without any racial preferences.
Figure 15: Relationship between β and diversity.
Parameters n = 50, r = 2, p = q = 1.
Table 2: Welfare with p = 0.7
q 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70
Panel A: Welfare on Euclidean societies
r = 2, direct marriages
Dv 0.00 0.13 0.25 0.35 0.44 0.52 0.59 0.72 0.83 0.92 1.00
St 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.88
Sz 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99
r = 2, long marriages
Dv 0.00 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
St 0.85 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89
Sz 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
r = 5, direct marriages
Dv 0.00 0.28 0.45 0.57 0.66 0.73 0.79 0.87 0.92 0.97 1.00
St 0.84 0.87 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.92
Sz 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00
r = 5, long marriages
Dv 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
St 0.85 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
Sz 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Panel B: Welfare on assortative societies
r = 2, direct marriages
Dv 0.00 0.14 0.25 0.35 0.44 0.52 0.59 0.72 0.83 0.92 1.00
St 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.87
Sz 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99
r = 2, long marriages
Dv 0.00 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
St 0.84 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87
Sz 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
r = 5, direct marriages
Dv 0.00 0.28 0.45 0.57 0.66 0.73 0.79 0.87 0.93 0.97 1.00
St 0.83 0.86 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90
Sz 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00
r = 5, long marriages
Dv 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
St 0.84 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91
Sz 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
∗Average over 10,000 random simulations, n = 50.
Sz equals the percentage of agents married.
Standard errors in the order of 1.0e-04.
Table 3: Welfare with p = 0.5
q 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.40 0.50
Panel A: Welfare on Euclidean societies
r = 2, direct marriages
Dv 0.00 0.17 0.32 0.45 0.56 0.66 0.74 0.89 1.00
St 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.87
Sz 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.98
r = 2, long marriages
Dv 0.00 0.95 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
St 0.85 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.88
Sz 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
r = 5, direct marriages
Dv 0.00 0.35 0.55 0.68 0.77 0.83 0.88 0.95 1.00
St 0.83 0.86 0.87 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.91
Sz 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99
r = 5, long marriages
Dv 0.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
St 0.85 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
Sz 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Panel B: Welfare on assortative societies
r = 2, direct marriages
Dv 0.00 0.18 0.33 0.45 0.56 0.66 0.74 0.88 1.00
St 0.58 0.58 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.61
Sz 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98
r = 2, long marriages
Dv 0.00 0.95 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
St 0.84 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87
Sz 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
r = 5, direct marriages
Dv 0.00 0.35 0.55 0.68 0.77 0.83 0.88 0.95 1.00
St 0.58 0.60 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.64
Sz 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99
r = 5, long marriages
Dv 0.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
St 0.84 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91
Sz 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
∗Average over 10,000 random simulations, n = 50.
Sz equals the percentage of agents married.
Standard errors in the order of 1.0e-04.
Table 4: Welfare with p = 0.3
q 0 0.05 1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
Panel A: Welfare on Euclidean societies
r = 2, direct marriages
Dv 0.00 0.27 0.49 0.66 0.80 0.90 1.00
St 0.80 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.85
Sz 0.91 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.95
r = 2, long marriages
Dv 0.00 0.87 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
St 0.85 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89
Sz 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
r = 5, direct marriages
Dv 0.00 0.49 0.71 0.83 0.91 0.96 1.00
St 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30
Sz 0.91 0.94 0.95 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98
r = 5, long marriages
Dv 0.00 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
St 0.85 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
Sz 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Panel B: Welfare on assortative societies
r = 2, direct marriages
Dv 0.00 0.28 0.49 0.66 0.80 0.91 1.00
St 0.78 0.79 0.80 0.81 0.82 0.83 0.83
Sz 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.96
r = 2, long marriages
Dv 0.00 0.87 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
St 0.84 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87
Sz 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
r = 5, direct marriages
Dv 0.00 0.49 0.71 0.83 0.91 0.96 1.00
St 0.78 0.82 0.84 0.86 0.87 0.88 0.88
Sz 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.98
r = 5, long marriages
Dv 0.00 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
St 0.84 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91
Sz 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
∗Average over 10,000 random simulations, n = 50.
Sz equals the percentage of agents married.
Standard errors in the order of 1.0e-04.
Table 5: Welfare with p
q
= 10
p 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Welfare on Euclidean societies
r = 2, direct marriages
Dv 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00
St 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.19
Sz 0.75 0.79 0.81 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.87 0.87
r = 2, long marriages
Dv 0.75 0.87 0.91 0.94 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98
St 0.34 0.52 0.73 0.88 0.96 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Sz 0.84 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89
r = 5, direct marriages
Dv 0.91 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
St 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.36
Sz 0.76 0.80 0.83 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.89
r = 5, long marriages
Dv 0.60 0.76 0.90 0.96 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
St 0.87 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
Sz 0.94 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
∗Average over 10,000 random simulations, n = 50.
Sz equals the percentage of agents married.
Standard errors in the order of 1.0e-04.
Table 6: Welfare with β = 2
q 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Welfare on Euclidean societies
r = 2, direct marriages
Dv 0.00 0.06 0.12 0.16 0.21 0.25 0.29 0.32 0.35 0.38 0.41
St 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88
Sz 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
r = 2, long marriages
Dv 0.00 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41
St 0.85 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88
Sz 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
r = 5, direct marriages
Dv 0.00 0.14 0.24 0.32 0.38 0.43 0.47 0.51 0.54 0.57 0.59
St 0.85 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91
Sz 1.00 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
r = 5, long marriages
Dv 0.00 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59
St 0.85 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91
Sz 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
∗Average over 10,000 random simulations, n = 50, p = 1.
Sz equals the percentage of agents married.
Standard errors in the order of 1.0e-04.
C Appendix C: Interracial Marriages and Pop-
ulation Composition
In this final Appendix, we estimate the number of interracial marriages that
would occur in 2015 if the racial composition of the U.S. population would
have remained constant since 1980.
The main complication of estimating the adjusted rate of interracial mar-
riage is that there is little data available regarding newlyweds. Only the
1980 U.S. Census and the American Community Survey (ACS) from 2008
to 2015 allow us to identify subjects who recently married. The new mar-
riages in 1980 can be identified using the variables age and age of marriage.
Whenever those two coincide, we know that a couple married within a year
of the data collection. In the ACS 2008 – 2015, married subjects were asked
directly whether they married within the last year. The data is available at
https://usa.ipums.org/usa. We use the 1 percent samples.
We obtained the percentage of subjects that married interracially by race
in 1980 and 2015. Hispanics were not recorded as a race in 1980, so we
estimate which percentage of other races are Hispanics. The races we consider
are White, Black, Native Americans, Asians, and Hispanics. Also from the
Census and the ACS, we obtain the racial composition of the U.S. both in
1980 and in 2015 (Table 7), and estimate the interracial marriages that would
occur with random marriage.30
Table 7: U.S. population composition by race, in percentage
Race 1980 2015
White 80 64
Black 11.6 12.2
Native 0.5 0.7
Asian 1.5 4.84
Hispanic 6.5 16.3
Multiracial 0 2
Source: Authors’ analysis of 1980
decennial census and 2015 ACS.
Random marriage is easy to compute. If 80% of Americans were White
in 1980, a White American had a 0.2 probability of intermarrying. This is
30The Stata code is available at www.josueortega.com.
5.33 times larger than the real intermarrying rate for Whites in 1980, which
was 0.0375% only (Table 8). Our constructions of interracial rates by race
are different from those by Lee and Edmonston (2005) as we estimate the
race for Hispanics in 1980. Hispanic was not considered a race in the 1980
decennial census, despite the fact that Hispanics have problems identifying
themselves with any of the major races.
Table 8: U.S. interracial marriage rate by race
Race 1980 2015
White 3.8 10.8
Black 5.6 20.0
Native 51.5 55.3
Asian 24.1 32.3
Hispanic 27.3 30.2
Source: Authors’ analysis of 1980
decennial census and 2015 ACS.
We fix the 1980 ratio between actual and predicted interracial marriages.
We use this ratio to compute the interracial marriage rate that would have
occurred in 2015 with the population composition of 1980, using the predic-
tion obtained from random marriage.31
Our estimates suggest that, even accounting for demographic change, the
percentage of interracial marriages in our society increases by 30% to 37%.
While this estimation needs to be taken with care, due to the limitations of
the data available, it adds further evidence to our claim that increase in the
number of interracial marriages in our societies cannot be due exclusively to
changes in the composition of the U.S. population by race. Furthermore, if
the increase in interracial marriage we observe in the data was due to changes
in the population composition, the intermarriage rates for Black Americans
should remain relatively constant over time, just like the fraction of the U.S.
population that is Black. However, we observe that the intermarriage rates
for Black Americans more than triplicate from 1980 to 2015, as described in
the main text.
31A similar estimation appears on “Why is interracial marriage on the rise?”, Priceo-
nomics, 1/9/2016.
